An unpatched Windows 11 weakness lets someone who is physically holding a locked computer start programs on it without knowing the PIN or password. The technique, called FastUnlock, was published on November 19, 2026 by the researcher known as MSNightmare / Nightmare Eclipse, and the endpoint-security firm ThreatLocker independently reproduced it the same day. Microsoft has not released a fix or an advisory yet, and there is no CVE identifier.
What happened
The researcher's GitHub disclosure is a short post with a demonstration video. According to ThreatLocker's test, FastUnlock abuses Narrator, the screen reader built into Windows, from the Microsoft account recovery flow that is reachable on the lock screen (the "forgot my PIN" path). Using Narrator's keyboard navigation (Caps Lock plus the arrow keys), the tester could move into Windows settings from behind the lock screen and launch a program from an external drive.
The access is limited: the code runs as a built-in account that ThreatLocker identified as WSIAccount, which it says is "not an administrator account." The Hacker News reports that nothing shows the method has been used in real attacks so far.
Who is affected
The technique needs three things, per ThreatLocker: physical access to the machine, a Microsoft account available through the lock screen's recovery options, and Narrator navigation. No official list of affected Windows versions has been published, so any Windows 11 computer that meets those conditions should be treated as possibly affected. Laptops that can be lost or stolen, shared desks and front-counter PCs are the most exposed.
Why BitLocker doesn't fully help here
Many Windows PCs encrypt their drives with BitLocker. In the common "TPM-only" setup, the computer's security chip unlocks the drive automatically at startup, so by the time the lock screen appears the files are already readable. FastUnlock does not break the encryption or steal the key; it runs on a machine that has already unlocked its own drive. That is a smaller problem than cracking an encrypted disk, but a real one for a device in someone else's hands.
What to do now
- Shut down or hibernate laptops when they leave your control, instead of just locking or sleeping them.
- On sensitive machines, add a BitLocker startup (pre-boot) PIN so the drive does not unlock on its own. This protects a machine that is powered off or hibernated, not one already sitting at the lock screen.
- Keep physical control of devices, and don't treat the lock screen alone as a security boundary.
- Watch for Microsoft's fix or advisory and apply it as soon as it ships.
Takeaway for builders
Accessibility and account-recovery screens are reachable before anyone signs in, which makes them part of the attack surface. Any app or device that offers help, recovery or assistive features on a locked or logged-out screen should treat those flows as untrusted input and test what they can open.