A single network change may have halted every flight departure in the United States for more than four hours. On Friday, November 13, 2026, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a rare nationwide ground stop after its air traffic control network became unstable. In a Q&A published on Sunday, November 15, the FAA said there is no indication of a cyberattack. The early evidence points to network equipment instead.
What happened
According to the FAA, the problem began at about 3:30 p.m. Eastern Time on November 13. The agency said its legacy equipment became unstable when data began flooding its FTI network (the telecommunications backbone that links FAA facilities) at a rate of 1,000 connection attempts every 4 to 5 seconds. That flood caused instability in aircraft communications and radar feeds at 17 of the FAA's 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers, and it spread to several approach control facilities.
The FAA said this was not a full outage. Some radio frequencies and radar feeds kept working, and about 3,500 aircraft already in the air landed safely. Flights resumed at 8:15 p.m. the same day. By late Friday, nearly 10,000 flights had been canceled, according to Flightradar24 data cited by Reuters.
How it worked
The FAA's initial investigation names two possible sources of the flood: a radar site in Amarillo, Texas, and a radio communications site in El Dorado, Arkansas. L3Harris, the FAA's network service provider, had been deploying a new router in El Dorado as part of work to replace old copper lines with fiber. When the abnormal traffic appeared, L3Harris blocked both locations and the network stabilized.
Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy told ABC News that the router was "broadcasting data from this radio facility into the whole network." As a precaution, the broadcast function was turned off on all 69 of the new routers in the national airspace system. Both routers are being examined at an L3Harris lab in Florida. Officials have not yet said whether the cause was an installation error or a faulty device.
Why it matters for builders
This is a textbook blast radius failure. One misbehaving device at a remote site was able to push enough traffic to destabilize a national system. The same pattern shows up in cloud outages, broadcast storms in office networks, and retry storms in microservices. The lesson is to design so that no single node can overwhelm everything else.
What to do
- Segment networks so a fault in one site or service stays local.
- Rate-limit connections and retries per device or client, and alert on sudden spikes.
- Roll out new hardware and configuration in stages, with a fast way to isolate a site.
- Keep degraded modes that still work when part of the network fails.
The root cause is still under investigation. We will update this story if the FAA or L3Harris publishes more findings.






