Transport for London (TfL), the authority that runs London's Underground, buses and the Oyster travel-card system, says the personal details of about 265,000 Oyster photocard customers were accessed in a cyber incident detected on 16 November 2026.
What happened
Oyster photocards are personalised smartcards that give free or discounted travel to groups such as children and teenagers, students, apprentices, care leavers, veterans and Londoners over 60. On Monday, 16 November, photocard customers began receiving unexpected emails asking them to "create an account" even though they already had one. According to Infosecurity Magazine, those emails were sent by unauthorised actors from TfL's own system and were "generated as a result of the compromise". TfL investigated, confirmed a breach and took the photocard website offline.
What was exposed
TfL told affected customers that the following details from their web accounts were compromised:
- Names
- Email addresses, phone numbers and home addresses
- Dates of birth
- Security questions and answers
TfL says no photos, passwords, bank or payment card details or journey histories were taken, and that no names or dates of birth of children with Zip Oyster cards were compromised. It has notified the UK data protection regulator, the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO), and says the incident is contained. Customers can keep travelling and topping up at station machines, but cannot apply for or renew photocards online while the site is down.
Why it matters
This is the second time in just over two years the photocard system has been taken down by a cyber incident. In September 2024, an attack forced TfL to suspend new photocard applications for more than two months; the BBC later reported that data on about 10 million people had been stolen in that case. TfL's director of technology strategy, Shashi Verma, told BBC Radio London the breached system "was tested quite thoroughly last year", adding that new attack tools are appearing "almost month by month".
The stolen mix is exactly what scammers need for convincing TfL-themed phishing: a real name, address and birth date make a fake refund or "verify your account" message far more believable. Security answers are a particular problem. Unlike a password, the true answer to "your mother's maiden name" or "your first school" cannot be changed, and many people reuse them across banks and other services.
What to do
- If you hold an Oyster photocard, change your TfL password and your security question and answer once the site is back.
- Change the password and security answers on any other service where you reused them.
- Treat unexpected emails, texts or calls claiming to be from TfL with suspicion and verify through TfL's official website.
For builders
Treat knowledge-based security questions as already leaked: prefer passkeys or app-based MFA for account recovery, store any security answers hashed like passwords, and alert on unusual bulk use of your own email-sending features, which was the first visible sign here.

